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In May 1970, U.S. intelligence analysts learned approximately
70-80 American POWs were being held at Son Tay Prison, located about
30 miles west of Hanoi, Vietnam.
On June 1, 1970, Army Brig.
Gen. Don Blackburn, the special assistant for Counterinsurgency and
Special Activity, briefed Air Force Lt. Gen. John Vogt, JCS/J3, and
Army Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, on options for a rescue attempt.
By
mid-July, a study group had developed a plan, and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the concept. Ironically, mid-July was precisely
when the North Vietnamese moved the POWs from Son Tay.
Training took place at Eglin Air Force Base in Northwest Florida.
Air Force Brig. Gen. Leroy Manor commanded the Joint Contingency
Task Group and Army Col. Arthur “Bull” Simons served as his deputy.
At Eglin, helicopter and C-130 crews began a regimen of
night flying, refueling practice and close formation work. The crews
also practiced negotiating terrain similar to what they would fly in
Vietnam to avoid North Vietnamese radar.
By mid-September,
the aircrews were ready to train with the ground force, an
all-volunteer force selected from Army Special Forces, commanded by
Army Lt. Col. Elliott “Bud” Sydnor. The ground troops consisted of a
20-man command and security group, a 14-man compound assault team
led by Army Capt. Dick Meadows, and a 22-man support group led by
Simons.
On Sept. 17, night training began using a mockup of
the Son Tay Prison Compound that had to be taken down during the day
to avoid being spotted by Russian satellites.
In
mid-November, the force deployed to Thailand to make final
preparations. Despite conflicting last minute intelligence reports
about the prison's status, the raid was given the green light to
proceed.
The importance of light conditions necessary to
conduct the raid led to two prime windows of opportunity – Oct.
21-25 or Nov. 21-25. Unable to get Presidential approval before the
October window, leaders decided to execute during November. An
approaching typhoon and the resulting weather conditions however,
forced Manor to shift the execution date earlier than planned, to
Nov. 20-21.
Shortly after 11 p.m., November 20, the
helicopters and refuelers took off. As the choppers approached North
Vietnam, 116 mission support aircraft took off from bases in
Thailand and carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin to conduct diversionary
strikes. Upon entering the objective area, the raiders dropped
flares, fire-fight simulators, and a pallet of napalm to create a
fire as an anchor point for the medium attack aircraft, the Douglas
A-1 Skyraiders.
The helicopter carrying Simons' forces
mistakenly landed in a nearby military school. By the time Simons
realized what happened, his troops had already breached the wall and
were encountering heavy resistance. The helicopter pilot rushed back
to the landing zone to pick up Simons and his troops. Within three
minutes, they were on the way to the prison compound, leaving behind
numerous dead enemies.
The helicopter with Meadows' forces
“crash” landed in the compound as planned. Troops rushed out the
rear ramp, each running to his assigned objective. Using a bullhorn,
Meadows shouted, “Keep down! We're Americans.” Within 12 minutes
however, all teams had reported no signs of POWs. Sydnor's force had
landed, realized they were alone and immediately put an alternate
plan in action to search all the buildings and block enemy
reinforcements from reaching Son Tay.
Fortunately, they were
quickly reunited with Simons' force and conducted the mission as
originally planned. The entire raid lasted 29 minutes.
The
raid, the diversionary attacks by naval aircraft, and the air cover
were executed precisely and almost flawlessly. The fortuitous
“mistake” of landing Simons' force at the school may have saved the
lives of many of the raiders. Twenty-two of his men killed 100-200
enemy before getting out and moving to the correct position.
Meadows' assault team, Sydnor's ground forces, and the aircrews
performed perfectly.
Manor and Simons took a group of
volunteer Airmen and Soldiers and trained them together in isolation
in order to conduct the raid. The time required to build and train
this specific task force was necessary since there was no standing
task force at the time. This was just one example used to convince
Congress of the need for a standing joint task force that eventually
led to the establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command.
This raid demonstrated the definite need for correct and timely
intelligence for special operations missions. The Son Tay Raid was a
highly classified and compartmentalized operation. However, the
strategic importance of the mission was understood at the highest
levels, leading to unheard of inter-service and interagency
cooperation.
Even though the mission was not successful in
recovering American POWs, it showed in no uncertain terms, the
United States had the ability and the political will to conduct a
raid deep in North Vietnam.
Shortly after the raid, all the
American POWs were consolidated in two prison complexes in downtown
Hanoi where they were held in large groups, as opposed to the
solitary confinement they had been forced to live through before the
raid. There, the prisoners learned the details of the raid, which
along with slightly better living conditions, did quite a bit to
improve their morale.
By U.S. Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. Reina Barnett
U.S. Special Operations Command
Provided through DVIDS
Copyright 2015
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