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The joint force puts the U.S. nuclear deterrent at the top of its
list for modernization and recapitalization and these no longer can
be deferred, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told
House Armed Services Committee members on March 8, 2017.
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The Cold War Nuclear Triad has evolved to a more “capabilities-based” posture to deal with multiple aggressors across a spectrum of contingencies.
(Image courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense)
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Air Force Gen. Paul J. Selva and Air Force Gen. John Hyten,
commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified before the House
panel on the military assessment of nuclear deterrence requirements.
Joining them for the hearing were Navy Adm. Bill Moran, vice chief
of Naval Operations, and Air Force Gen. Stephen Wilson, vice chief
of staff of the Air Force.
Selva said that over the past
decade considered decisions have been made to defer some nuclear
force modernization to address urgent needs while maintaining a
safe, reliable and secure arsenal and delivery capability.
“But in making those decisions we have squeezed about all the life
we can out of the systems we currently possess,” the general added,
“so that places an extra premium on a very deliberate long-term
investment strategy to replace those systems as existing systems age
out of the inventory.”
Nearing a Crossroads
The nation’s nuclear deterrent is nearing a crossroads, Selva told
the panel.
“We are now at a point where we must concurrently
recapitalize each component of our nuclear deterrent,” he said, “the
nuclear weapons themselves, the triad of strategic delivery
platforms, the indication-and-warning systems to support our
decision processes, the command-and-control networks that connect
the president to our field forces, and our dual-capable tactical
aircraft that can be equipped with nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
Nuclear modernization no longer can be deferred, the general
said, adding, “Any disruption of the current program of record for
future acquisition plans will introduce significant risk to our
deterrent.”
In his comments, Hyten said that at a time when
other nations continue to modernize and upgrade their nuclear
forces, nearly all elements of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile,
delivery systems and other critical infrastructure are operating
well beyond their designed service life.
“Maintaining
strategic deterrence, assurance and escalation control capabilities
requires a multifaceted long-term investment approach and a
sustained commitment to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent,”
the general said, “[and] that nuclear deterrent is only as effective
as the command and control that enables it to function.”
Unpredictable challenges posed by today's multi-domain, multi-threat
security environment make it increasingly important to optimize the
legacy nuclear command, control and communication, or NC3, systems
and leverage new technologies and capabilities, Hyten said.
NC3 systems are essential for providing early warning and
time-critical information to the National Command Authority for
decision making, and effectively directing triad forces in response
to a strategic crisis, Hyten explained in written testimony, and
“any delay, deferment or cancellation of NC3 modernization will
create a capability gap that potentially degrades the president’s
ability to respond appropriately to a strategic threat.”
Retaining the Triad
In advance of consultations last year with members of the
Obama administration on potential options for how to manage the
nuclear triad, Selva said the Joint Chiefs met and affirmed the need
to maintain a triad.
This was largely to manage strategic risks from Russia and
China as potential nuclear adversaries, an increasingly aggressive
North Korea and its pursuit of nuclear weapons and a potential
future entry of Iran into the nuclear arena, he added.
“Based on the collection of potential threats and
adversaries that exist in the world,” Selva said, “the Joint Chiefs
affirmed the necessity to maintain a triad and to modernize the
weapon systems, the indications of warning and the command and
control associated with that triad.”
Hyten also believes the triad is fundamental to deterrence
and should be retained and modernized. “To deter,” he added, “you
have to have a capability that provides the adversary a calculus
that he looks at and decides that his options will fail. If the
adversary has capabilities to operate from the sea, from the land
[and] from the air, we have to be able to turn all those elements.
That's how the triad was developed and that's how we need to go.”
Qualitative Advantage
In Selva’s remarks he said the path chosen to modernize and
replace the existing nuclear arsenal, “particularly the delivery
systems, the indications and warning, and command-and-control,”
potentially puts the United States in a position to retain its
qualitative advantage and capitalize on the advantage over time.
The advantage comes with “continuing to have a triad that
gives us a ballistic missile force that confounds Russian and
Chinese targeting, a bomber force that is resilient enough and
capable enough to penetrate enemy air defenses and respond to a
nuclear attack, and a survivable portion of that triad, in the case
of our strategic ballistic missile submarines, that gives us an
ability to respond even if an adversary were to believe that they
could execute a decapitating attack on our nuclear capability,”
Selva said.
For those reasons, the general added, “it is our strategy
going forward to continue to modernize all three legs of the triad
in order to continue to pose unsurvivable targeting challenges to
adversaries that match us in number and [are] very close to matching
us [in the quality of] delivery systems themselves.”
By Cheryl Pellerin
DOD News
Copyright 2017
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