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WASHINGTON, DC -- The burning of federal buildings in the nation's
capital 200 years ago this week was a psychological victory for the
British, but little else, according to an Army historian.
The
Chesapeake Campaign, which ended with the Battle of Baltimore in
September 1814, was really a diversion, undertaken by the British to
draw the Americans away from the campaign in Canada, said Glenn
Williams, U.S. Army Center of Military History.
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The burning of federal buildings in the nation's capital 200 years ago this week was a psychological victory for the British, but little else, according to an Army historian. (Image
courtesy of Library of Congress)
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Williams said the War of 1812 was, by-in-large, a success for the
U.S. Army, given the circumstances leading up to the war -- meaning
a small Army (described in part one
of this three-part series).
The pre-expansion Army was
well-trained and well-led. The problem came in trying to expand from
a 6,000-man force to a 35,000-man one, starting in the spring of
1812. At the beginning of the war, many units were not well-trained,
but improved over time, he said.
"I think it is important to
note that the U.S. Army had proven itself equal on the battlefield
by the summer of 1814 --- as evident with the Battles of Chippewa,
Lundy's Lane, Fort Erie and Plattsburgh," he added.
DIVERSIONARY STRATEGY
Besides wanting to defend Canada from further invasions, the British
were planning their own counter-invasion of the U.S. from the north,
Williams said, and raids around Chesapeake Bay were designed to
divert U.S. forces.
The British fleet sailed up and down the
Chesapeake Bay and Potomac River, as well as numerous inlets,
raiding settlements and blockading vessels. The largest of these
raids took place beginning on Aug. 19, 1814, when Adm. George
Cockburn and Maj. Gen. Robert Ross landed upstream on the Patuxent
River, in Maryland.
The combined force marched north toward
Washington, D.C. A squadron of barges went up the Patuxent parallel
to the army as far as it could, Williams said. The six-ship squadron
that sailed up the Potomac was primarily a supporting attack or
diversion, and with a secondary mission to evacuate Ross' army if
its retreat had been cut off. The "fleet" itself had to stay in the
deeper water of the Chesapeake and lower Patuxent.
Secretary
of War John Armstrong didn't think the British would attack
Washington, which was of little strategic, military or economic
significance compared to the much larger and wealthier port city of
Baltimore. As such, Williams said, little to nothing was done to
prepare the city's defenses.
On Aug. 24, the British land
forces of around 4,500 arrived just outside of Washington, D.C. at
Bladensburg in Prince George's County. There, they were met by some
6,500 militia and 420 regular Army troops.
It would seem that
with the British outnumbered and far away from home turf, they'd
stand little chance of success against the Americans, who were
defending their capital.
But that's not what happened.
That the militia was a well-trained, strategic reserve is a
"myth," Williams said. "Some were well trained and did very well in
battle, but most did not."
And, the militia -- both regular
and volunteer -- only became part of the "armies of the United
States" when called into federal service by the president, he added.
The militias at Bladensburg, and everywhere else in the U.S. for
that matter, could be divided into two types, he said.
The
first were the common or regular militia, also known as the enrolled
militia, he explained. These were made up of every able-bodied white
male citizen, between the ages of 18 and 45.
These units were
organized regionally and their members might drill a couple times a
year, if that, he said. They were not considered professional
Soldiers, but if an emergency arose, they were an available pool of
manpower that could be drawn from, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, when necessary. These units were usually named after
their company commander's name, like Smith's Riflemen.
The
second type were volunteer militia, from which the National Guard
traces its heritage, he explained. These volunteers purchased their
own uniforms and in many cases their own weapons, and drilled
regularly. While not "professional," its members participated as an
"avocation." And, the units were permanent organizations, usually
raised by civic groups. Instead of being named after their company
commanders, these units usually had patriotic names.
The
volunteer militia was by no means a Reserve of the Army, as known
today. The National Guard, as it now exists, wasn't really organized
as such until 1903, he added. The volunteer militia were state
forces, with some being better than others. They could only be used
within their own state by orders of the governor. The only time they
could cross state lines was if they were "detached" by their states
for federal service, when "called" by the president.
In this
case, President Madison did authorize them to do so.
In the
ensuing battle that took place at Bladensburg, the 175th Volunteer
Infantry Regiment of Maryland acquitted itself well for most of the
battle, Williams said. They are considered a descendant unit of
today's Army National Guard's Fifth Maryland.
That they
performed well was attested by a British commander, who after
crossing the Anacostia River with his men, wrote in a letter after
the battle: "They checked the ardor of my men's advance," Williams
noted.
But, with little help from other American units, the
British force eventually overwhelmed the 5th, overlapping their
flanks and forcing them to retreat, Williams said. Their formation
fell apart once the British started shooting them in the backs.
The District's artillery militia company also did extremely
well, taking a high toll on the advancing British, he said. When the
overall commander, Brig. Gen. William Winder, ordered them to fall
back, they did so in good order and were prepared to fight again.
Francis Scott Key, who opposed the U.S. going to war before it
started, was a lieutenant in in the District of Columbia militia
artillery. (Key will reappear in part III of this series, along with
Winder.)
'BLADENSBURG RACES'
Besides having very little training and action under
fire, there were some leadership issues as well, that led to the
failure to hold Bladensburg, Williams said.
The hastily crafted defenses ordered by Winder
were as follows, he said. The first-line skirmishers, mostly
sharpshooters, were arranged along the riverbank of the Anacostia.
The second line was held by the Maryland 5th and two drafted
regiments. This second line was in a position to block to the fork
in the main road leading to Georgetown or Washington.
The
third line consisted of Sailors and Marines, along with some
Maryland and D.C. militia and regulars.
This is where things
get interesting, Williams said.
Wandering around the battle
area were two figures of note, Madison and Secretary of State James
Monroe, who would later become president after Madison. Neither were
in command but their presence carried some weight.
Monroe
"took it upon himself to move one of the three Maryland regiments to
a different location where the other two could not support them,"
Williams said. "His meddling probably did a lot to unseat Winder's
plans, even though Winder himself was not a great tactician."
And besides that, Monroe didn't even tell Winder what he'd done,
he added. Monroe will reappear in part III of this series.
There are numerous lessons learned there: "unity of command,
interservice cooperation, and the importance of communications" on
the battlefield being foremost, he said, noting that the Army did
take these and other lessons to heart following the war -- except
for disposing the myth of the overvalued militia.
As for the
regulars in the third line who were being recruited and trained for
the 36th and 38th U.S. Infantry, Winder ordered them off the field
of battle even before they engaged, Williams said. Their commander,
William Scott, protested the order because he and his men were eager
to get into the fight.
At this point, the American lines of
defense were breaking and Winder is said to have remarked that the
battle is already lost. He then ordered the regulars and a militia
brigade -- composed of two regiments from Washington and Georgetown
-- to fall back to Washington, D.C., to form a new defensive line.
However, Williams noted, he never told the other militia where to go
so they took off for Georgetown or the Montgomery Court House. That
is what the British disparagingly call the "Bladensburg races."
As for Madison, he was there to "watch the battle," Williams
said, and he almost rode into the British advance guard before being
advised by Winder and his aides that it would be better for him to
vacate to a safer area. But in any case, Madison is credited with
being the first commander in chief on the battlefield under fire.
With the crumbling of the defenses of Bladensburg, the road was
now open for the British advance on Washington.
BURNING THE CAPITAL
The
burning of government buildings in Washington, D.C. -- including the
Capitol and the President's House, as the White House was then
called -- was more a psychological victory for the British than a
military victory, according to Williams.
Although the buildings of government were destroyed, the government
itself had dispersed around the area and would soon reform and
regroup, under the leadership of President Madison.
One
significant Army installation in D.C. that was destroyed was an Army
arsenal at Greenleaf Point, now called Fort McNair. Soldiers had
thoughtfully removed the powder from the arsenal and lowered it into
a nearby well.
Somehow the British got wind that suspicious
activity had taken place at the dry well, so it is said that a
Soldier lowered a lantern down, or threw down a torch, see what was
there. The gunpowder then exploded, killing a number of British
soldiers, Williams said. Incidentally, another source has it that an
officer threw his cigar into the well causing it to explode.
After the explosion and a severe storm that hit Washington, the
British withdrew to their fleet and prepared for an invasion of
Baltimore, a much more important port than Washington, and many
times larger and wealthier. It would be a real prize if the British
could take it, Williams noted.
By David Vergun
Army News Service
Copyright 2014
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